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Abstract
Policy and guideline proposals for ethical artificial-intelligence research have
proliferated in recent years. These are supposed to guide the socially-responsible
development of AI for the common good. However, there typically exist incentives
for non-cooperation (i.e., non-adherence to such policies and guidelines); and, these
proposals often lack effective mechanisms to enforce their own normative claims.
The situation just described constitutes a social dilemma—namely, a situation
where no one has an individual incentive to cooperate, though mutual cooperation
would lead to the best outcome for all involved. In this paper, we use stochastic
evolutionary game dynamics to model this social dilemma in the context of the
ethical development of artificial intelligence. This formalism allows us to isolate
variables that may be intervened upon, thus providing actionable suggestions for
increased cooperation amongst numerous stakeholders in AI. Our results show
how stochastic effects can help make cooperation viable in such a scenario. They
suggest that coordination for a common good should be attempted in smaller groups
in which the cost for cooperation is low, and the perceived risk of failure is high.
This provides insight into the conditions under which we should expect such ethics
proposals to be successful with regard to their scope, scale, and content.
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence promises to fundamentally change nearly every facet of our lives, for better or
worse [66; 70; 103]. In response to this reality, there has been a proliferation of policy and guideline
proposals for ethical artificial-intelligence and machine-learning (AI/ML) research. Jobin et al. [83]
survey several global initiatives for AI/ML and find no fewer than 84 documents containing ethics
principles for AI research, with 88% of these having been released since 2016. These documents are
meant to specify ‘best practices’ to which engineers, developers, researchers, etc. ought to adhere.
For example, the Montréal Declaration for the Responsible Development of AI identifies a set of
abstract normative principles and values intended to promote the fundamental interests of stakeholders;
signatories are invited to commit to ‘the development of AI at the service of the individual and the
common good’ [171]. Proposals of this sort typically highlight issues concerning transparency,
justice and fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility, and privacy, among others [83]. These initiatives
generally take one of two approaches to foster the ethical practice of AI research: proposing principles
to guide the socially-responsible development of AI or examining the societal impacts of AI [101].
However, policies-and-procedures documents, like the Montréal Declaration, are examples of ‘non-
legislative policy instruments’ or ‘soft law’ [152], which are instruments for cooperation that are not
legally binding. This stands in contrast to ‘hard law’, which consists in legally-binding regulations
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passed by legislatures. By definition, then, these reports are not intended to produce enforceable
rules but are meant merely as guides for ethical practice. Therefore, the proliferation of such guiding
principles raises pressing questions about their efficacy. It has been suggested that such declarations
have little to no practical effect [60]; at least one study finds that the effectiveness of ethical codes
for influencing the behaviour of professionals in the technology community is virtually nonexistent
[106].
Part of the problem is that, in the AI research community, as in many other social contexts, there are
typically costs associated with cooperation—e.g., the additional time and financial resources that are
required to ensure research and business practices adhere to the proposed normative standards—in
addition to incentives for non-cooperation or non-adherence to ethics agreements—e.g., a lucrative
defence contract to develop autonomous weapons. Furthermore, non-legislative policy instruments,
like guiding principles, lack effective mechanisms to enforce (or reinforce) their own normative
claims, because they depend on voluntary, non-binding cooperation between the relevant parties—e.g.,
individual researchers, labs, academic bodies, corporations, governments, international bodies, etc.
This failure should come as no surprise to game theorists and economists: in the situation just
described, no one has an individual incentive to cooperate, although mutual cooperation would lead
to the best outcome for all those involved. This constitutes a social dilemma [2; 31; 71; 76; 136; 144].
In this paper, we use stochastic evolutionary game dynamics to model this social dilemma in the
context of the ethical development of AI. This model allows us to isolate variables that may be
intervened upon; this, in turn, helps to formulate actionable suggestions for increased cooperation
amongst numerous stakeholders in AI. Our results show how stochastic effects can help make
cooperation viable in such a scenario, and they suggest that coordination for a common good should
be attempted in smaller groups in which the cost for cooperation is low, and the perceived risk of
failure is high. This analysis provides insight into the conditions under which we may expect such
policy and guideline proposals for safe and ethical AI to be successful in terms of their scope, scale,
and content. This, in turn, yields plausible solutions to the social dilemmas that the AI/ML community
face for acting in a socially responsible and ethical way that is aligned with a common good.3
In Section 2, we discuss related work. In Section 3, we present an evolutionary game which models
cooperation (with respect to proposed ethical norms and principles in AI) using a social dynamics
framework. Select results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we discuss related work and highlight how our model-based analysis of adherence
to AI ethics guidelines, when understood as a social dilemma, provides substantive and actionable
suggestions for fostering cooperation.
Artificial Intelligence and Normative Guides. As mentioned, non-legislative policy instruments,
in the form of ethics guidelines, have proliferated in recent years. These guidelines, codes, and
principles for the responsible creation and use of new technologies come from a wide array of sources,
including academia, professional associations, and non-profit organisations [47; 53; 61; 81; 128;
137; 154; 160; 161; 162; 163; 170; 171; 172]; governments [37; 54; 55; 74]; and industry, including
for-profit corporations [33; 52; 78; 79; 108; 123; 139; 143; 151]. Several researchers have noted that
the very fact that a diverse set of stakeholders would exert such an effort to issue AI principles and
policies is strongly indicative that these stakeholders have a vested interest in shaping policies on AI
ethics to fit their own priorities [15; 57; 83; 173].
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has also been widely noted that ethics policies for AI research are typically
or relatively ineffective: they do not have an actual impact on human decision-making in the field of
AI/ML [60]; they are often too broad or high-level to guide ethics in practice [181]; and they are, by
their very nature, voluntary and nonbinding [24; 180].
The content of ethics guidelines can be varied to promote adherence. For example, substantial changes
in abstraction can help the application, impact, and influence of ethics principles for AI by way of
targeted suggestions that can be implemented easily and concretely in practice [48; 112]. However,
while several authors have noted the inefficacy of guiding principles, and have offered proposals
3Of course, it is nontrivial to determine precisely what a ‘common good’ is; see discussion in Green [56].
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to surmount this inefficacy, such proposals are, themselves, often couched in inherently normative
language. Therefore, they too fail to instantiate any mechanisms for their own reinforcement.
For example, ethics policies and guidelines can be understood deontically, insofar as they provide
static, universal principles to be adhered to [4; 110]. Hagendorff [60] takes the inefficacy of such
policies to be a failure of deontic ethics, proposing that AI ethics should instead be couched in a
virtue-ethics framework.4 But these types of solutions are themselves ineffective insofar as they are
merely meta-level normative principles which recommend adherence to object-level principles. Some
reflection shows that we can then ask the same question of the meta-level principles as we did of
the object-level ones: Should we expect these to be effective? By dint of what? Since there is no
mechanism by which these meta-level principles can be enforced, they provide no solution to the
inefficacy created by the proliferation of principles and guides for ethical AI. Instead, the problem is
merely reproduced a level up.
In asking how the application and fulfilment of AI ethics guidelines can be improved, we shift the
focus from the content of the principles and related meta-ethical considerations to the cooperative,
social aspects of the dilemma. Namely, we examine the circumstances under which we should expect
cooperative success to be possible or likely in a socio-dynamical context. This analysis has significant
practical implications for regulatory principles in AI/ML, which are made all the more pressing as
these technologies are increasingly integrated into society.
3 A Socio-dynamic Model of Cooperation for Ethical AI Research
In this section, we describe the model that we employ using standard techniques from evolutionary
game theory. (See Appendix A for some additional background details.) This formal framework
has been applied to social dilemmas like climate change [42; 126; 174] nuclear proliferation [21;
22; 88; 185], conflicts over water resources [102], etc. However, it has yet to be applied to the
cooperative challenges that are faced in the context of AI safety and ethics. We begin by discussing
the mathematical structure of the model, including the payoff structure and dynamics. In Section 4,
we investigate the effect of several variables on the possibility or likelihood of cooperation in the
context of non-legislative policy instruments for AI research.
Model and Parameters. A population of size Z is organised (divided) into groups of size N .
Each individual in the population may be interpreted as an AI researcher who can realise or ignore
some proposed norm(s) of research and practice. The population can be thought of as the global AI
community at large, and each group of size N in the population can be thought of as an organisational
unit—e.g., a research laboratory, a university department, a collaborative research group, etc.—which
can sustain shared norms. Individuals are classified according to the strategy that they choose with
respect to the proposed norms for ethical behaviour within the community: they can choose either to
cooperate (C), by adhering to the proposed norm, or to defect (D), by flouting the proposed norm.5
Each individual has an initial endowment, b ∈ R+. Contributing to a collective, cooperative effort
imposes a cost, c ∈ [0, 1], to the cooperator, consisting in a fraction of their endowment; defecting
requires no such contribution. The cost may be construed as an additional effort relative to the
non-cooperative baseline—e.g., taking extra precautions to ensure research and business practices
adhere to the proposed normative standards—or in terms of opportunity costs—e.g., by refusing
lucrative projects that would violate the proposed normative standards.
A normative agreement is successful if the fraction of contributors exceeds some threshold, p∗ ∈
(0, 1).6 If this cooperative threshold is not achieved, then with some probability, r, everyone in
the group loses a fraction, m, of their endowment. r can be interpreted as the perceived risk of
negative consequences in the event of a failure to cooperate, andm can be understood as the perceived
magnitude of those consequences. That is, when m = 1 (the failure to cooperate is perceived to be
4Virtue ethics is a moral theory which emphasises the role of an individual’s character and virtues in
evaluating the rightness of actions [5; 6; 29; 45].
5We assume here that individuals who choose to cooperate, or who say they will cooperate, in fact do so.
6A social threshold is common to many public endeavours—for example, international agreements that
require a ratification threshold to take effect [26; 51; 125; 126; 142; 153; 177].
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maximally impactful), individuals risk losing all of their endowment; m = 0 represents the situation
in which failure to reach an agreement has no perceived negative consequence.7
This provides a five-dimensional space to analyse the possibility of cooperation in our social dilemma:
the size of the groups in which cooperation is attempted, N ; the perceived risk of negative conse-
quences when cooperation fails, r; the perceived magnitude of said consequences, m; the cost of
cooperation, c; and the critical threshold of cooperators required to avoid negative consequences, p∗.
Payoffs. The payoffs for each strategy determine the game. An individual’s payoff depends upon
what action the individual chooses and what everyone else in the community is doing. The payoffs to
cooperators in a group of size N when nC individuals are cooperating is given in Equation 1,
piC(nC) = b ·Θ(k) + b · (1− rm) ·Θ(k)− cb, k = nC − n∗. (1)
n∗ = dp∗ ·Ne is the critical number of cooperators in a group, and Θ is the Heaviside step function.8
Equation 1 has two key terms. The left-hand summand (b ·Θ(k)) provides payoff b to the cooperator
just in case k = nC − n∗ ≥ 0; this is the payoff when cooperation succeeds. When cooperation
fails (nC − n∗ ≤ 0), the right-hand summand (b · (1− rm) ·Θ(k)) comes into play. This payoff is
weighted by the cost of failure as a function of the risk and magnitude of some negative consequence,
(1− rm). So, when r and m are maximal (rm = 1), the entire endowment is lost if cooperation fails;
when the risk or magnitude are nonexistent (rm = 0), none of the endowment is lost. Finally, the cost
of cooperation, cb, is subtracted from the payoff for successful cooperation or failure to cooperate.
The payoff to defectors is defined in terms of the payoff to cooperators, as in Equation 2:
piD(nC) = piC(nC) + cb. (2)
We calculate the average payoff to each type, C,D, as a function of the group size, N , and the
fraction of each type in the broader population, xC and xD = 1 − xC , respectively. First, we
find the fraction of cooperators in the population, xC = nZC/Z. We then calculate the vector of
(binomially-distributed) probabilities for each possible group, composed of k cooperators and N − k
defectors. We then compute the vector of conditional probabilities (k/N ) of being a cooperator in
each combination. We compute the average payoff to the cooperators by weighing the payoff for
cooperation by the probability of being a cooperator, as described. And, mutatis mutandis for the
average payoff to defectors. The mean payoffs capture the expectation if the entire population, Z,
were randomly paired into groups of size N . See Appendix B for formal details.
Dynamics. We consider the dynamics of small, finite populations. The dynamics determine how
the population changes based on assumptions about how the payoffs affect the fitness of strategies,
given what others are doing. Our model uses a dynamics called the Fermi process [164]. This
involves a pairwise comparison where two individuals—a focal individual and a role model—are
sampled from the population at random. The focal individual copies the strategy of the role model
with probability p, depending on a comparison of the payoffs of those strategies. If both individuals
have the same payoff, the focal individual randomises between the two strategies. The probability is
a nonlinear function of the payoff difference for p, called the Fermi function [35; 41],
p =
[
1 + eλ(pif−pir)
]−1
, (3)
where λ ∈ R+ is the intensity of selection, which specifies the importance of neutral drift compared to
the selection dynamics. pif , pir are the payoffs of the focal individual and the role model, respectively.
In addition to the parameters described above, we further assume some small rate of mutation, µ,
which can be interpreted as mutation, experimentation, error, or noise. For all the results we present
in Section 4, we set λ = 5, µ = 0.10.
In our model, we specify the transition probabilities of the population changing from a state containing
nZC cooperators to one with (n
Z
C + 1) or (n
Z
C − 1) cooperators (i.e., the transition from the dynamics
yielding one more or one fewer cooperator in the population at large). A transition matrix (for all
possible states) is populated by recursive application of the transition probabilities. The transition
7Note that perceived risk of collective failure has proved important for successful collective action in
dilemmas of this sort [109; 126; 142].
8That is, Θ(k) = 1 when k ≥ 0, and Θ(k) = 0 otherwise.
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matrix is used to compute the gradient of selection for our dynamics. This is defined by the difference
between the probability that the number of cooperators increases and the probability that the number
of cooperators decreases. We compute the stationary distribution of the process using standard
techniques [141]. Again, see Appendix B for formal details.
4 Results
In this section, we examine the results of our model under simulation.9 This is useful since human
behaviour involves so many degrees of freedom that meaningful analytic results are often unlikely to
be obtained. As is common practice in game-theoretic models of social behaviour, we are primarily
interested in high-level qualitative results—such as whether cooperation will tend to succeed—rather
than exact quantities.
Simulation Parameter Values. In our simulations, we fix the population, Z = 100, and the
endowment, b = 1. All other parameters are variable: this includes the size of the groups, N ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 20}; the perceived risk of negative consequences occurring if cooperation fails, r ∈ [0, 1];
the cost of those consequences, understood in terms of the proportion of endowments lost, if
cooperation fails, m ∈ [0, 1]; the proportion of the endowment that is contributed by cooperators,
c ∈ [0, 1]; and the critical threshold of cooperators required in order for cooperation to succeed,
p∗ ∈ [0, 1], which determines the number of cooperators required, n∗ = dp∗ ·Ne.
Qualitative Dynamics. We compute the mean payoff to each strategy, the gradient of selection,
and the stationary distribution for the dynamics as described in Section 3. The gradient of selection
gives the probable direction of evolution in the short run, whereas the stationary distribution captures
the long-run proportion of time that the process spends at any given state. This is the appropriate
method of analysis for such finite-population dynamics [111; 164]; see Figure 1 for examples.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: Examples of each qualitative dynamic for the gradient of selection (top) and stationary
distribution (bottom) of the mean-field dynamics, resulting in (a) a prisoner’s dilemma favouring ALL
DEFECT; (b) a bi-stable dynamics favouring the ALL DEFECT equilibrium; (c) a bi-stable dynamics
favouring the POLYMORPHIC equilibrium; and (d) a prisoner’s delight favouring ALL COOPERATE.
The gradient may change from selection for an equilibrium where ALL DEFECT is the unique stable
state (top of 1a), displaying the qualitative dynamics of a prisoner’s dilemma [144]; to a bi-stable
dynamics with both an ALL DEFECT equilibrium and a POLYMORPHIC equilibrium, where both
strategies can coexist in the population (top of 1b, 1c—the latter corresponds to an anti-coordination
game [134]); to (in rare circumstances) a unique equilibrium of ALL COOPERATE (top of 1d), where
the qualitative dynamics yield a prisoner’s delight [18].
When there is a unique stable state, the stationary distribution reflects that the process spends the
majority of its time near this state (bottom of 1a, 1d). However, when there are multiple stable states
(1b, 1c), the dynamics may or may not guarantee population-level success relative to the demands of
the cooperative challenge—the stationary distribution shows us the proportion of time spent at each
state. Hence, although a mixed-population of cooperators and defectors is stable in Figure 1b, the
stationary distribution indicates that the stable configuration of ALL DEFECT is most probable.
9Our code outputs visual graphics of the selection gradient, average payoffs to each strategy, and the
stationary distribution. A GUI with variable parameters is available online at https://amohseni.shinyapps.
io/tragedies-of-the-commons/.
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In sum, there are four possible qualitative outcomes for our population under the dynamics described:
(1) ALL DEFECT is the unique stable state, near which the process spends all its time; (2) both ALL
DEFECT and a POLYMORPHIC state in which both cooperators and defectors co-exists are stable, yet
the process spends a majority of its time near the ALL DEFECT equilibrium; (3) both ALL DEFECT and
a POLYMORPHIC state are stable, but the process spends the majority of its time near the polymorphic
mixture; and (4) ALL COOPERATE is uniquely stable and the process tends toward this state.
Simulation Results. We want to know how the parameters of interest interact with the achievement
of cooperative success (the situations shown in 1c or 1d), and which of those will have the greatest
effect. Our dynamics encode a process by which strategies that are more successful proliferate
via imitation; so, for cooperation to succeed it must be that cooperators do better on average than
defectors. Each of the parameters will either work for or against cooperative success. We will
examine their respective effects by first considering their extremal values.
It should be obvious that when the cost of cooperation is maximal (c = 1), defect (D) will dominate
since cooperators have nothing to gain from cooperation in this scenario. Therefore, the lower the
cost of cooperation, the more likely individuals will be to cooperate. However, we will see that even
a low cost of cooperation does not ensure cooperative success.
At the other extreme, when the cost of cooperation is minimal (c = 0), cooperate (C) is the strictly
dominant strategy in almost all cases—the exception is when there is no benefit to cooperation
(r · m = 0), and so the payoffs for C and D are equivalent. On the other hand, if the cost of
cooperation is nonzero (c > 0), and there is no payoff for cooperative success (r ·m = 0), then
D is strictly dominant. That is, improbable but highly consequential failures to cooperate and
highly probable but inconsequential failures to cooperate will evoke the same cooperative (or non-
cooperative) response. Transitions between qualitative dynamics as a function of the risk, r, and
magnitude, m, of the consequences of cooperative failure are given in Figure 2.
(a) N = 2 (b) N = 5 (c) N = 10 (d) N = 20
Figure 2: Qualitative dynamics as a function of the risk, r, and magnitude, m, of the consequences of
a failure to cooperate. In each case, p∗ = 0.5, c = 0.01.
Further, Figure 3 makes clear that cooperative success requires the ratio of the benefit of avoiding the
failure to cooperate (r ·m) and the cost of cooperation (c) to be sufficiently favourable.
(a) N = 2 (b) N = 5 (c) N = 10 (d) N = 20
Figure 3: Qualitative dynamics as a function of the product of the risk, r, and magnitude, m, of the
consequences to fail to cooperate (r ·m) and the cost of cooperation, c. In each case, p∗ = 0.50.
Figures 2 and 3 also illustrate the critical role that group size plays in the prospects of cooperative
success. In particular, all else equal, smaller group sizes are more favourable for cooperation. This is
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perhaps counter-intuitive; however, the result can be explained as follows. Recall that cooperators
must obtain higher average payoffs for cooperation to be favoured. Moreover, agents contribute to
the prevalence of cooperation in their respective groups by choosing to cooperate (or not).
When group size is minimal (N = 1), an agent who chooses to cooperate ensures cooperative success
by dint of her action alone. Thus, all groups composed of cooperators succeed, and all groups
composed of defectors fail. (This holds for non-extremal values; i.e., c > 0, m · r > 0, and p∗ > 0.)
This is sufficient to ensure selection for cooperation.
At the other extreme, when the cooperative group grows arbitrarily large (N →∞), an agent’s action
makes a vanishing contribution to the prospect of cooperative success.10 Furthermore, by the law of
large numbers [16; 131], the proportion of cooperators and defectors in large groups will approach
the precise proportion of cooperators and defectors in the whole population. Hence, any group will
tend to be equally likely to succeed or fail. Yet, in such groups, defectors will obtain higher payoffs
by dint of not having payed the cost to cooperate. This is sufficient to ensure selection for defection.
In between these extremes, smaller group sizes will tend to favour cooperation and disfavour defection.
Thus, we find a special instance of the general pattern that correlation between strategic actions
conduces to pro-social behaviour [63; 64; 147], where here the relevant form of correlation is realised
by the contribution of the individual’s action to the composition of the group’s actions.11
Finally, we can consider the effect of the critical threshold for cooperation, p∗, on the prospects for
cooperative success; see Figure 4.
(a) N = 2 (b) N = 5 (c) N = 10 (d) N = 20
Figure 4: Qualitative dynamics as a function of the critical fraction of cooperators required for
success, p∗, and the cost of cooperation, c. In each case, r ·m = 0.50.
Logically, at the extreme where the critical threshold is minimal (p∗ = 0), cooperation ‘succeeds’
without need of cooperators, and so defection is dominant. However, when the critical threshold
is nonzero (p∗ > 0), the general pattern is that the smaller the fraction of cooperators required for
cooperation, the more likely cooperation is to succeed. Indeed, sufficiently demanding cooperative
endeavours mean that while a POLYMORPHIC equilibrium in which cooperation co-exists with
defection is stable under the gradient of selection, the stationary distribution demonstrates that
arriving and remaining at such a cooperative state may be vanishingly unlikely.
5 Conclusion
A priori, one might have thought that inhibitive costs provide the biggest obstacle for cooperative
success. Our model provides evidence for this intuition. Thus, our first moral is the obvious one.
Moral 1: Lowering the cost of cooperation increases the likelihood of cooperative success.12
10The reader may identify that this strategic structure is analogous to that of the Paradox of Voting [32].
11Correlation can be realised variously in a social dilemma—e.g., assortative mating [36; 65], kin selection
[62; 105], homophily [107], and network effects [23], among others. All of these support cooperation insofar
as they make cooperators more likely to interact with one another, and less likely to interact with defectors.
Although we lack the space to discuss these here, they constitute an important further dimension of our analysis.
12This moral pertains to the likelihood of signing on to an agreement in the first place, but there is also a
question of whether individuals who say they will cooperate in fact do so cooperate [93]. When signals are
cheap, they can be uninformative or dishonest [28; 38; 39; 178]. It is well-understood that costly signals can
promote honesty [84; 90; 132; 186; 187].
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However, our model highlights that the dynamics of cooperation here are more subtle than this. We
show that even for small costs, the dynamics may not guarantee population-level success relative to
the demands of the cooperative challenge for a range of parameter values.13 Perhaps most surprising
is the magnitude of the effect of group size on these outcomes. Thus, we propose the following.
Moral 2: Small, decentralised groups may benefit sustained cooperation for responsible AI research.
In the context of globalisation, one might have thought that the best approach for fostering AI ethics
and safety was to have a universal set of principles to which everyone agrees. However, our model
identifies that cooperation spreads as individuals observe other groups succeeding in their cooperative
endeavours; this is fostered by the existence of many smaller groups where cooperation can more
easily get off the ground. Hence, targeting policy agreements at smaller, independent groups, such as
individual research labs or professional organisations, may constitute a more effective path to the
aims of the universal adoption of ethical guidelines.
We mention how small group sizes help cooperation in virtue of the relationship between positive
correlation between strategies and selection for pro-social behaviour. Yet another way to realise such
correlation is via free partner choice. When individuals who are inclined to cooperate in adherence to
norms are able to freely join one another in their efforts, this can increase their relative likelihood of
success and so spread their example throughout the population. Thus, we get the following corollary.
Moral 3: Voluntary participation in AI policy agreements may catalyse the spread of cooperation.
Individuals choosing to adhere to a set of principles (or not) creates positive correlation. So, affording
individuals the option of choosing their cooperative group may be more beneficial than stipulating
that one must be a part of the group. However, even in small groups cooperation can fail. Hence,
Moral 4: It is important to accurately figure both the risks and the consequences of non-cooperation.
The action-relevant parameters in our model are perceived risk and magnitude. Therefore, it is
essential to accurately figure the actual risks and potential consequences of non-cooperation. Namely,
if the perceived risk is significantly lower than the actual risk, then cooperation may fail to obtain
despite its (understated) real-world importance. Failing to cooperate, when cooperation matters,
incurs a greater loss than cooperating when it was not entirely necessary to do so; hence, there may
be less harm in overstating the negative consequences of failing to cooperate.14 One real-world
suggestion that we might glean from this is that it may be beneficial to further incorporate education
on AI ethics and safety across a breadth of educational curricula and public outreach efforts.
The insights thus far centre primarily on group dynamics; this says nothing whatsoever about the
actual content of ethics guidelines for AI. Of course, the content of these guides can significantly
affect the likelihood that community-wide norms are taken up. For example, if the proposed norms
are impossible to be instantiated, then they will fail to be adopted. Our final moral addresses this.
Moral 5: Combining many proposals may undermine their prospects for success.
The likelihood of being willing to adhere to and able to fulfil a set of policies is bounded by the
likelihood of adhering to and fulfilling the conjunction of the policies it contains. We show that
policies can vary in the magnitude of the cooperative challenge they present. The combination of
these facts should make us wary of how demanding we make our policy proposals, if initial and
sustained adherence is our aim. Instead, a piecemeal approach in which agents can sign on and gain
from participation in single policies may provide a better first step on the path to the ultimate fixation
of a robust set of norms for safe and ethical AI.
In closing, we note that even disciplines and fields whose norms of self-regulation are relatively
well-entrenched, as in medical practice and biomedical ethics, guiding principles can be ineffective,
or at least inefficient, in guiding actual practice when there are competing incentives [100].15 This
13In our model, the cost for cooperation is nonnegative. So, we do not account for incentives to cooperate—i.e.,
rewards. Conversely, we could lower the payoff for defectors by introducing punishment for non-cooperation.
This is already something that has been done by, e.g., the ACM [8]. Although, empirical data suggests rewards
are better than punishments for promoting cooperative behaviour in similar social dilemmas [34; 86].
14This is a typical line of argument in much of the existential risk literature; see, e.g., Russell [138].
15Although, this is not to say that the solution is to simply impose hard laws—this will likely also be
ineffective; see discussion in LaCroix and Bengio [92].
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is true even when there is consensus amongst researchers and practitioners about the guidelines
themselves [99]—and, it should be apparent that no such consensus exists in AI/ML.
In contrast to other work that has highlighted the inefficacy of non-legislative policy agreements in
AI/ML, our analysis focused on the socio-dynamics of cooperation. In doing so, we were able to
discuss the circumstances under which we should expect cooperation to arise in the first place. Further,
instead of providing normative suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of extant guidelines by
varying their content, the normative suggestions that we forward here pertain to the social aspects of
cooperation; as such, we do not fall prey to the meta-normative inefficacy described in Section 2.
Broader Impact
Epistemic humility is a virtue in modelling work. The results derived from mathematical models of
socio-dynamic phenomena are best understood as alerting us to the lower-bound on the complexity
of those phenomena, and as providing tentative hypotheses that we must combine with empirical
evidence and experimentation to adequately inform our judgements. It would be an error to observe
the results of such a model and to become convinced that one fully apprehends the cooperative
challenge it depicts.
It would also be a mistake to interpret our results and arguments as a dismissal of current proposals
or guidelines for the safe and ethical development of AI. To the contrary, we believe that such efforts
are laudable and necessary; but to give ourselves reasonable odds for success, we must appraise
ourselves of an understanding of the basic dynamics of such coordination problems. These mistaken
interpretations of our results—with their concomitant negative impacts—must be avoided.
From nuclear proliferation and climate change to ethical AI and AI safety, social dilemmas charac-
terise the gulf between us and the futures for which we hope. The potential positive social impacts of
our work are plain. Artificial intelligence promises to fundamentally change nearly every facet of
our lives, for better or worse. Hence, effective adherence to ethical norms throughout the process of
making numerous inevitable advances in AI will make a difference to the tally of instances in which
the process promotes or deranges the prospects of human flourishing.
Our contribution to this count is simple. We deploy theoretical tools from evolutionary game theory
to analyse the nature of the social dilemma at play in promoting participation in, and adherence to, the
proposed policies and norms. We provide insights that, one the one hand, have not obviously informed
extant guidelines and policies, and that, on the other hand, correspond to tractable changes in those
proposals which may yield significant impact. If we succeed, stakeholders—research laboratories,
university departments, collaborative research groups, and so on—aiming to formulate and coordinate
around policy guidelines may have a richer awareness of the challenges involved that may inform the
scope, scale, and content of such proposals.
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Supplementary Material
A Game Theory
In this brief appendix, we provide some further game-theoretic background than we had space to
discuss in Section 3. For more comprehensive introductions to game theory, see, e.g., Aumann and
Hart [9, 10, 11]; Maynard Smith [104]; Neumann and Morgenstern [115]; Weibull [179]; Young and
Zamir [184].
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation and Conflict. Cooperative behaviour persists in human
and non-human animal populations alike, but it provides something of an evolutionary puzzle
[13; 30; 68; 113; 116; 118; 157]: How can cooperation be maintained despite incentives for non-
cooperative behaviour (i.e., defection)? Evolutionary game theory provides useful tools for analysing
the evolution of cooperative behaviour quantitatively in both human and non-human animals [7; 40;
49; 58; 59; 72; 73; 80; 89; 104; 119; 121; 122; 133; 168; 179].
Game theory can be used to study the ways in which independent choices between actors interact to
produce outcomes.16 In game theory, a game is determined by the payoffs. For example, the payoff
matrix for a generic, 2× 2, symmetric, normal form game is displayed in Figure 5.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C (a, a) (b, c)
D (c, b) (d, d)
Figure 5: Payoff matrix for a generic, 2× 2, symmetric, normal form game.
Each actor (Player 1 and Player 2) in this example can choose one of two strategies, C or D. The
payoffs to each of the players are given by the respective entries in each cell—i.e., the first number in
the top-right cell (b) is the payoff afforded to Player 1 when she plays C and her partner plays D; the
second number (c) is the payoff afforded to Player 2 in the same situation (i.e., when Player 2 plays
D and Player 1 plays C).
As discussed in the paper, social dilemmas are games where (i) the payoff to each individual for non-
cooperative behaviour is higher than the payoff for cooperative behaviour, and (ii) every individual
receives a lower payoff when everyone defects than they would have, had everyone cooperated [31].
When c > a > d > b, in Figure 5, we have a Prisoner’s Dilemma.17 Note that when both actors
cooperate (i.e., both play C), their payoff is higher than if they both defect (a > d), thus satisfying
criterion (ii) mentioned above. However, each actor has an individual incentive to defect (i.e., play
D) regardless of what the other actor does; Player 1 would prefer to defect when Player 2 cooperates
(c > a), and she would prefer to defect when Player 2 defects (d > b)—and mutatis mutandis for
Player 2. This satisfies criterion (i) above.
In this case, we say that defect is a strictly dominant strategy for each player, which leads to the
unique Nash equilibrium: 〈D,D〉—that is, a combination of strategies where no actor can increase
her payoff by unilateral deviation from her strategy. The ‘dilemma’ is that mutual cooperation yields
a better outcome for all parties than mutual defection, but, from an individual perspective, it is never
rational to cooperate.
16See Ross [136] for a philosophical overview.
17Named and formalised by Canadian mathematician Albert W. Tucker in 1952, based on Merrill M. Flood
and Melvin Dresher’s 1950 model; see Serrano and Feldman [144].
20
Evolutionary Game Dynamics. In an evolutionary context, the payoffs are identified with re-
productive fitness, so that more-successful strategies are more likely to propagate, reproduce, be
replicated, be imitated, etc. This provides a natural way to incorporate dynamics to the underlying
game.
There are two natural interpretations of evolutionary game dynamics. The first is biological, where
strategies are encoded in the genome of individuals, and those who are successful pass on their
genes at higher rates; the second is cultural, where successful behaviours are reproduced through
learning and imitation. We are primarily concerned with processes of cultural evolution. This process
should be familiar to those in AI/ML who work on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)
[95; 145; 188].
In addition to the game, an evolutionary model requires a specification of the dynamics—namely, a
set of rules for determining how the strategies of actors in a population will update (under a cultural
interpretation), or how the proportions of strategies being played in the population will shift as they
proliferate or are driven to extinction (under a biological interpretation). Evolutionary game dynamics
are often studied in infinite populations using deterministic differential equations. For example, the
replicator dynamic [159] captures how strategies with higher-than-average fitness tend to increase,
and strategies with lower-than-average fitness tend to decrease. A population state is evolutionarily
stable only if it is an asymptotically stable rest point of the dynamics [104].
Stochastic Game Dynamics. In finite populations, stochastic game dynamics are used to study the
selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness [98; 120; 146; 155; 156; 165].
A standard stochastic game dynamics that is used extensively is the Moran process. This is a simple
birth-death process where an individual is chosen proportional to their fitness and replaces a randomly
chosen individual with an offspring of its own type [3; 27; 75; 96; 97; 158; 167; 182; 183].
In the standard Fermi process, which we discuss in Section 3, an individual is chosen randomly from
a finite population, and its reproductive success is evaluated by comparing its payoff to a second,
randomly-selected individual from the population [96; 166; 167].
As mentioned in Section 3, the pairwise comparison of payoffs of the focal individual and the role
model informs the probability, p, that the focal individual copies the strategy of the role model; the
probability function, called the Fermi function, was presented in Equation 3, and repeated here for
convenience:
p =
[
1 + eλ(pif−pir)
]−1
.
Again, if both individuals have the same payoff, the focal individual randomises between the two
strategies. Note, then, that the focal individual does not always switch to a better strategy; the
individual may switch to one that is strictly worse.
When the intensity of selection λ = 0, selection is random; when selection is weak (λ  1), p
reduces to a linear function of the payoff difference; when λ = 1, our model gives us back the
replicator dynamic; and, when λ→∞, we get the best-response dynamic [46].
Evolutionary game dynamics have been used to shed light upon many aspects of human behaviour,
including altruism [44; 50; 140; 169], moral behaviour [1; 20; 67; 148; 150], empathy [43; 127],
social learning [85; 114; 135; 175; 176], social norms [12; 17; 19; 25; 87; 94; 124], and the evolution
of communication, proto-language, and compositional syntax [14; 69; 77; 82; 91; 117; 129; 130;
149; 189], among many others. See Ross [136] for further details.
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B Technical Details
In this brief appendix, we provide some further formal details for our model than we had space to
discuss in Section 3.
Mean Payoffs. Recall that the payoffs to each cooperators, C, and defectors, D, in a group of size
N are given as a function of the number of cooperators in that group, nC , as follows:
piC(nC) = b ·Θ(nC − n∗) + b · (1− rm) ·Θ(nC − n∗)− cb,
piD(nC) = piC(nC) + cb,
where Θ is the Heaviside step function. The mean payoffs to each type in a population of size Z,
where groups are determined by random mixing, is then given as a function of the total fraction of
cooperators in the population, xC = nZC/Z, as follows:
ΠC(xC) =
N∑
nC=0
nC
N
(
N
nC
)
xnCC (1− xC)N−nCpiC(nC),
ΠD(xC) =
N∑
nC=0
N − nC
N
(
N
nC
)
xnCC (1− xC)N−nCpiD(nC).
Fermi Dynamics. The Fermi dynamics uses the average payoffs to each type to determine the
probability that a randomly-chosen individual from the population will imitate the strategy of a second
randomly-chosen individual from the population. Such a change will produce one of three outcomes:
the number of cooperators in the population, k = nZC , will increase, decrease, or remain the same.
This is captured by the following transition probabilities, which yield a tri-diagonal transition matrix,
T , for our birth-death process:
T+(k) = (1− µ) k
Z
Z − k
Z − 1
(
1 + e−λ(ΠC−ΠD)
)−1
+
µ
2
T−(k) = (1− µ)Z − k
Z
k
Z − 1
(
1 + e−λ(ΠD−ΠC)
)−1
+
µ
2
T 0(k) = 1− T+(k)− T−(k)
where λ is the inverse temperature associated with the influence of selection versus drift, and µ is the
rate of mutation. This produces an ergodic Markov process.
Gradient of Selection. The gradient of selection of the process captures the expected direction of
selection as a function of the number of cooperators in the population, k, in a way that is analogous
to the mean-field dynamics for the infinite-population case. This is given by
G(k) = T+(k)− T−(k) = k
Z
Z − k
Z − 1
(
tanh
λ
2
(ΠC(k)−ΠD(k))
)
,
where G(k) > 0 implies that selection will favour cooperation, and G(k) < 0 implies that defection
is favoured.
Stationary Distribution. The stationary distribution of the process captures the long run distribu-
tion of time the process spends at each state. For an ergodic process, the stationary distribution is
known to be unique and independent of initial conditions of that process. We compute is as follows.
σk =
∏k
i=1
T+(j−1)
T−(j)∑Z
i=1
∏i
j=1
T+(j−1)
T−(j)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , Z}.
The stationary distribution can also be approximated via the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation which
states that nth step transition matrix corresponds to the nth power of the one-step transition matrix,
Tt = T
t. Thus, we get that σ corresponds to any row of the matrix given by limt→∞ T t.
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